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Abstract—We assume that a buffer-aided transmitter commu-
nicates with a receiving node in the presence of an attacker. We
investigate the impact of a radio-frequency energy-harvesting
attacker that probabilistically operates as a jammer or an
eavesdropper. We show that even without the need for an external
energy source, the attacker can still degrade the security of the
legitimate system. We show that the random data arrival behavior
at the transmitter and the channel randomness of the legitimate
link can improve the system’s security. Moreover, we design a
jamming scheme for the attacker and investigate its impact on
the secure throughput of the legitimate system. The attacker de-
signs his power splitting parameter and jamming/eavesdropping
probability based on the energy state of the attacker’s battery to
minimize the secure throughput of the legitimate system.
Index Terms—DoS, eavesdropping, energy harvesting.
I. INTRODUCTION
Radio-frequency (RF) energy-harvesting (EH) schemes en-
able charging of wireless nodes by exploiting energy of
the ambient RF signals, where a wireless node converts the
received RF transmissions into a direct current (DC). The
two most promising schemes for RF energy harvesting are
the time-switching scheme [1], where the receiver switches
between data reception and energy harvesting, and the power-
splitting scheme [1], where the receiver splits the signal into
two streams of different powers for decoding information and
harvesting energy separately to enable simultaneous informa-
tion decoding and energy harvesting.
Communication secrecy in an information-theoretic sense
was first investigated in the seminal work of Wyner [2] which
is known as physical (PHY) layer security. The PHY security
is measured by the secrecy rate which is determined by the
difference between the rates of the legitimate link and the
eavesdropping link.
Several works have investigated the impact of specific active
malicious attacks such as denial-of-service (DoS) attacks [3],
replay attacks [4], and data injection attacks [5]. The DoS
attack, which blocks the communication between legitimate
transceivers, has received great attention since it is the most
accomplishable [3], [6], [7]. Recently, several researchers have
investigated the linear quadratic Gaussian (LQG) control cost
function problems under DoS attacks [3], [8]. In [3], the
authors proposed a semi-definite programming-based solution
to design a feedback controller that minimizes a cost function
subject to energy constraints. The authors of [8] investigated
the zero-sum game between a controller and a jammer.
The authors of [9] investigated the optimal jamming at-
tack strategies by optimizing the probability of jamming and
transmission range. The author of [10] investigated the impact
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of active jamming attacks on underwater wireless sensor
networks. In [11], the authors designed an optimal attack
schedule to maximize the attacking effect on the wireless
networked control system (WNCS). The DoS attacker has
to make the attack decision, i.e., when to attack and which
channel to be chosen. In contrast to all the above-mentioned
works, we assume that the attacker can sometimes remain
silent to intercept the communication between the legitimate
nodes. In addition, we assume that the eavesdropper exploits
the energy of the RF signals from the legitimate system to
power his battery.
In this letter, we design an opportunistic attack scheme
to maximize the attacking impact on the legitimate system.
The attacker is assumed to be an RF-EH node with infinite
size battery. Our main message is that an attacker with
no external energy source can still significantly degrade the
system security. We study the impact of the channel and
data arrival randomness at the legitimate transmitter on the
attacking mode. In our investigated scenario, the attacker has
to make the jamming or eavesdropping attack decision, i.e.,
jamming the channel to cause DoS or eavesdropping on the
transmissions. The main contributions of this letter, which
distinguish it from the related literature, are summarized as
follows
• We formulate a joint DoS/eavesdropping attack problem
and develop the optimal attack scheme that minimizes the
secure throughput of the legitimate system. In our analy-
sis, we consider the decoding and processing energies at
the eavesdropper’s receiver as well as the eavesdropper’s
battery dynamics. Furthermore, we investigate the impact
of the data buffer at the legitimate source node on the
system security.
• We design an access scheme at the legitimate system to
mitigate the attacks, which is important to reduce the
energy transfer rate to the attacker and helpful in draining
his battery.
• We derive closed-from expressions for the mean service
rate of the transmitter’s data queue, legitimate system
secure throughput, and the energy arrival and departure
rates at the eavesdropping node.
II. SYSTEM MODEL AND PROPOSED SCHEME
We consider the following wireless transmission scenario. A
buffered source node (Alice) wishes to transmit her data to her
receiving node (Bob) privately from a malicious node (Eve).
Time is partitioned into time slots where a time slot equals
the channel coherence time duration. Eve is assumed to be an
RF-EH node as in [12]. Hence, she converts the ambient RF
transmissions into energy. Moreover, we consider the general
case where a constant energy source is also available at Eve.
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That is, an amount of Econst energy units is supplied to Eve
per time slot. She needs at least Ed = PdT energy units to
decode Alice’s data during a time slot of T seconds where Pd
denotes the amount of power consumed by filters, frequency
synthesizer, etc. If Eve’s battery has energy lower than Ed, she
either harvests energy without power splitting or she jams the
channel between Alice and Bob. The jamming is beneficial to
Eve since she will force Alice to retransmit the data packets
and block Alice’s buffer, which can be used to further increase
the energy collected at Eve’s receiver. If Eve’s battery has
energy higher than Ed, Eve will either receive data and harvest
energy or jam the Alice-Bob channel. We denote the battery
at Eve as BE. Alice transmits her data with average power
PA Watts and Eve transmits her jamming signal with average
power PJ Watts.
Assume that the data buffer at Alice is denoted by QA
where each packet has a fixed size of b bits. To capture the
random nature of the data arrivals at the nodes, we assume
that the data arrivals at Alice are Bernoulli random variables
with mean λA packets/slot. The Bernoulli arrival model has
been commonly used for modeling the arrival process at source
nodes to capture the data traffic burstiness [13].1 To transmit
a data packet during a time slot with duration T seconds
and a channel bandwidth of W Hz, the target secrecy rate
is R = b/(WT ) bits/sec/Hz. Since we do not assume the
availability of Eve’s instantaneous channel state information
(CSI) at Alice, Alice can only choose a target secrecy rate
to design the random binning scheme which achieves the
instantaneous secrecy rate. The codebook rate of the random
binning scheme, denoted by RA, is set to the instantaneous rate
of the Alice-Bob link. If the instantaneous rate of the Alice-
Bob link is higher than the target secrecy rate R , Alice will
transmit the data packet and there is no connection outage.
If the rate of the Alice-Bob link is lower than R , Alice will
remain silent since the transmission will not be decoded at Bob
and Eve will take advantage of these transmissions to power
her receiver. At the end of a time slot, the legitimate receiver
(Bob) sends a feedback signal to acknowledge the correct/fail
decoding of the data packet [13].
The thermal noise is modeled as additive white Gaussian
noise (AWGN) with zero mean and power κ Watts. We assume
the flat-fading channel model where each channel coefficient
remains unchanged for the time slot (coherence time) duration,
but changes from one slot duration to another independently.
Since the channels are randomly generated, Alice does not
know the CSI of Eve when Eve operates as an eavesdropper
(i.e. during the time slots where Eve decides to eavesdrop, she
will remain completely silent, hence, Alice and Bob will not
be able to estimate Eve’s channel). Moreover, Eve does not
know the channel between Alice and Bob since we assume that
channel estimation is realized using pilots transmitted from
one side and the channel is estimated from the other side.
Since the channel between Alice and Bob is random and can
be in outage, Alice will transmit only when her channel is
not in outage. Hence, Alice saves her power and this strategy
1Changing the arrival model will only change the probability of the queue
being empty/nonempty. However, the rate expressions and the analysis are
unchanged.
might hurt Eve since Eve selects either the data eavesdropping
decision or the jamming decision and, hence, she will lose
energy Ed or EJ ≥ Ed, respectively. Similarly, the data traffic
burstiness and the data buffer state at Alice can lead to energy
losses at Eve. This shows that the channel and data arrival
randomness can be useful to secure the system. Based on this
observation, we suggest the use of a random access scheme at
Alice when the channel is not in outage. This helps in draining
the battery of Eve and, hence, she will not be able to decode
Alice’s data or jam Bob.
Eve decodes the data at energy cost Ed. If she does not
have this amount of energy in her battery, she will not be able
to decode the data transmitted by Alice. Hence, Eve harvests
energy. If Eve’s battery level is higher than Ed but lower than
EJ, she will harvest and decode data at the same time using
the power splitting scheme. We define ρ as the amount of
power fraction used for data decoding. If the energy state
at Eve’s battery is higher than EJ, Eve can either harvest
energy and decode data with probability 1−αE or jam Alice’s
transmission with probability 0 ≤ αE ≤ 1.
III. SYSTEM ANALYSIS
The mean service rate of Alice’s queue in packets/slot is
µA = (αA(1− αE) Pr{BE ≥ EJ}+ αA Pr{BE < EJ})P1 (1)
where γA = PA/κ, P1 = Pr{log2
(
1 + γA|hA−B|2
) ≥
R } which equals exp
(
− 2R−1
σ2A−BγA
)
for Rayleigh channel
model with σ2A−B denoting the Alice-Bob channel variance,
{log2
(
1 + γA|hA−B|2
) ≥ R } is the event that the Alice-
Bob link can support the target secrecy rate R , |hA−B|2γA
is the received signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) at Bob with hA−B
denoting the channel coefficient between Alice and Bob, αA
is the probability that Alice decides to access the channel,
and αE is the probability that Eve decides to jam. Note that
if there is interference, and since Alice designs the codebook
rate of the random binning scheme based on the instantaneous
rate of the Alice-Bob link when there is no jamming (since the
attack type is unknown a priori at Alice), there is a connection
outage and, hence, the throughput and queue service rate is
zero. If {BE < EJ}, Eve will either harvest and decode when
{Ed ≤ BE < EJ} or harvest only when {BE < Ed}.
Alice is active in a time slot if her queue is nonempty, she
decides to access the channel, and the channel of the Alice-
Bob link is not in outage. We denote Alice’s activity process by
IA, which equals to 1 when Alice is active and zero otherwise.
We also define IE as the activity indicator of Eve. Based on
the description given above, the energy harvested at Eve is
given by
EH = η|hA−E|2PAT IA1(BE < Ed)
+ η(1− ρ)|hA−E|2PAT IA1(Ed ≤ BE < EJ)
+ η(1− ρ)|hA−E|2PAT IA1(BE ≥ EJ)(1− IE)
(2)
where 0 ≤ η ≤ 1 is the RF-to-DC conversion efficiency and
1 (·) = 1 when the enclosed event is true.
When Eve decides to decode, she loses Ed energy units.
Furthermore, when she decides to jam, she loses EJ units.
The energy depletion at Eve is given by
Eout = IA
(
Ed1(Ed ≤ BE < EJ) +
(
EdIE + EJIE
)
1(BE ≥ EJ)
)
(3)
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where IE = 1− IE and EJ = PJT .
Eve’s battery evolves as follows
B(t+ 1) = B(t)− Eout + EH + Econst (4)
where B(t + 1) denotes the Eve’s battery state at time slot
t+1, and EH +Econst is the total energy collected at Eve in
a given time slot.
The secure throughput in packets/slot is given by
µsec = αA
(
Pr{BE ≥ EJ, QA > 0}(1− αE)
+ Pr{BE < EJ, QA > 0}
)
Pr
{
Rnojamsec ≥ R
}
+ αA Pr{BE < Ed, QA > 0}Pr
{
log2
(
1 + γA|hA−E|2
) ≥ R }
+ αAαEP2 Pr{BE ≥ EJ, QA > 0}
(5)
where P2 = Pr
{
log2
(
1 + |hA−B|
2γA
1+|hE−B|2γE
)
≥ R
}
, γE = PJ/κ,
and
Rnojamsec =
[
log2
(
1 + γA|hA−B|2
)− log2 (1 + ργA|hA−E|2)]+
(6)
The second term in (6), which is Eve’s rate, is a function of ρ
since Eve uses a power splitter. When there is jamming, Eve
will not eavesdrop. Hence, the security is achieved when the
direct link (i.e. Alice-Bob link) is not in a connection outage.
The closed-form expressions for the outage and secrecy outage
probabilities under Rayleigh fading channel model can be
easily derived and are omitted here due to space limitations.
Since Alice does not know the parameter ρ, we set the
access probability of Alice such that Alice’s queue is stable
under a lower bound on mean service rate of Alice’s queue.
If the queue is stable using the lower bound on the service
rate, then it will be stable for the actual operation. The queue
stability is a widely-used quality-of-service (QoS) measure for
buffered-aided nodes and is important here to decrease the
access times of Alice and, hence, hurt Eve by reducing the
energy collected at Eve’s receiver. Let us first obtain a lower
bound on µA in (1) as follows. Since Pr{BE ≥ EJ} ≤ 1,
µA ≥ αA (1− αE) exp
(
− 2
R − 1
σ2A−BγA
)
(7)
Using Loynes theorem, Alice’s queue is stable when λA ≤
αA(1 − αE) exp
(
− 2R−1
σ2A−BγA
)
.
When Eve decides to harvest and decode, she can further
enhance her performance by using a set of the collected
data after only τ ≤ T seconds to decide whether or not
Alice is active. This will save Eve’s energy since only a
portion of the decoding and processing energy will be used.
More specifically, assuming a processing power Pd, if the
eavesdropper decides to harvest for the whole transmission
time, the used energy in decoding is PdT . However, if the
eavesdropper uses only τ seconds to decide, the used energy
is Pdτ ≤ PdT with equality when τ = T . Assuming that Eve
uses an energy detector, the false alarm and miss-detection
probabilities are given by P τFA and P τMD, respectively. If Eve
miss detects the activity of Alice, i.e., considers Alice inactive
while she is active, Eve will stop decoding and harvesting.
Hence, she will lose both energy and rate. If there is a false
alarm, Eve will consider Alice to be active while she is not
active. Hence, Eve will waste her decoding energy without
any gain. On the other hand, if there is a correct detection
of Alice’s activity, Eve will not waste time in decoding noisy
signals when Alice is inactive. Increasing τ will decrease both
miss-detection and false-alarm probabilities, which helps Eve.
However, it will also increase the amount of energy used at Eve
in processing before deciding whether or not Alice is active.
The best choice for τ is challenging and Eve can optimize it,
in addition to the jamming/harvesting probability and power
splitting factor, to minimize the secure throughput of Alice.
The secure throughput is given in (8) at the top of next page
with P3 = Pr
{
log2
(
1 + γA|hA−E|2
) ≥ R }.
Updating (2), the energy harvested at Eve under channel
sensing is given by
EH = η|hA−E|2PAT IA
(
1(BE < Ed)
+ (1− ρ)( τ
T
IMD + ID)1(Ed ≤ BE < EJ)
+ (1− ρ)1(BE ≥ EJ)(1− IE)( τ
T
IMD + ID)
) (9)
where IMD = 1− ID = 1 when Eve miss detects the activity
of Alice. The energy depletion process at Eve is given by
Eout = EJIE1(BE ≥ EJ)
+Ed
(
IA
(
IMD
τ
T
+ ID
)
+ IA
(
IFA
τ
T
+ IFA
))
× (1(Ed ≤ BE < EJ) + IE1(BE ≥ EJ))
(10)
where IFA = 1 when Eve’s sensor generates a false alarm. For
a targeted false alarm probability, P τFA = PFA, the probability
of miss detection under Rayleigh fading channel model is
given by
P τMD = 1−
1
γ˜A
exp
(
1
γ˜A
)
×
∫ ∞
1
Q
√fsτ( Q
−1(PFA)√
fsτ
+1
Z
−1
) exp(− Z
γ˜A
)
dZ
(11)
where fs = 1/W is the sampling frequency, σ2A−E denotes
the Alice-Eve channel variance, γ˜A = σ2A−EγA, and Q−1(.)
is the inverse of Q -function.
To minimize the secure throughput, Eve solves the following
constrained optimization problem:
min :
αE,ρ
µsec, s.t. 0 ≤ ρ, αE ≤ 1 (12)
The optimization problem is nonconvex due to the nonconvex-
ity of the objective function. Eve can solve (12) OFFLINE
using the interior-point methods, or a 2-dimensional grid-based
search over the optimization variables. If Eve uses the 2-
dimensional grid-based search, she will divide the range of
each optimization variable into M points, and then compute
the objective function and the constraints for M2 times since
she optimizes over two optimization variables. The solution
obtained from such grid-based search will maximize the objec-
tive function and satisfy the constraints. These computations
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µsec=αA (Pr{BE ≥ EJ, QA > 0}(1− P τMD)(1− αE) + (1− P τMD)Pr{Ed ≤ BE < EJ, QA > 0}) Pr
{
Rnojamsec ≥ R
}
+ αA (Pr{BE ≥ EJ, QA > 0}P τMD(1− αE) + P τMD Pr{Ed ≤ BE < EJ, QA > 0}+Pr{BE < Ed, QA > 0}) P3
+ αAαE Pr
{
log2
(
1 +
|hA−B|2γA
1 + |hE−B|2γE
)
≥ R
}
Pr{BE ≥ EJ, QA > 0}
(8)
are performed offline and infrequently. The solution remains
unchanged as long as the system’s average parameters (e.g.
average channel gains) remain unchanged.
The attacker can learn the average system parameters by
monitoring the communications between Alice and Bob for a
sufficiently long duration as explained next. By sensing the
channel and knowing when the channel is busy and when it
is not, the attacker can estimate λA and the probability of
the queue being empty/enonempty. Moreover, by overhearing
the feedback channel from Bob to Alice, the link outage
probability can be computed and the channel statistics can be
estimated. The AWGN is due to thermal noise and its variance
is fixed. Alice’s transmit power can be estimated by measuring
the signal power at Eve over different time slots. In summary,
all the average system parameters can be estimated by the
attacker. If one parameter is completely unpredictable, Eve can
set this parameter to a known upper-bound value and operate
under this assumption.
IV. SIMULATION RESULTS AND CONCLUSIONS
We simulate our system using: 105 channel realizations,
W = 1 MHz, κ = 1 Watt, η = 0.6, Ed = 5 microjoules,
PJ/κ = 10 dB, and PA/κ = 10 dB. Each channel coefficient
is assumed to be independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.)
zero-mean circularly-symmetric complex Gaussian random
variable with unit variance. To demonstrate the effectiveness
of our proposed scheme in confusing the legitimate system
without the need for external power, we set Econst = 0, which
means that the attacker does not get any energy from any
external energy source.
In Fig. 1, we plot the secure throughput versus λA for the
proposed DoS/eavesdropping scheme under sensing and no
sensing schemes. As shown in the figure, increasing λA, which
is the amount of arrived data packets at Alice, increases the
secure throughput of Alice. The performance of our proposed
scheme with and without channel sensing is almost the same.
Hence, we conclude that adding the sensing phase will not
decrease the secure throughput of the legitimate system and,
from a complexity viewpoint, Eve can skip this phase. The
figure also shows the impact of increasing the transmit power
at Alice. As shown in the figure, increasing the transmit power
at Alice enhances the legitimate system’s secure throughput at
high data arrival rates. At low data arrival rates, using lower
power at Alice enhances the security since the EH rate at Eve
will decrease and, hence, the jamming probability decreases
and the data decoding probability at Bob increases. On the
other hand, at high data arrival rates, Alice’s data queue will
be saturated with data packets. Hence, the attacker increases
his jamming probability which reduces the battery level at the
attacker and reduces his ability to jam. Consequently, using
higher power levels at Alice enhances the security due to
the increase of the successful data decoding probability at
Bob. However, since Alice does not know the used power-
splitting ratio at Eve, she will not be able to compute the
secure throughput. Hence, Alice will not be able to optimize
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Fig. 1. Secure throughput versus λA. In the figure’s legend, ‘PS’ refers to
‘proposed scheme’.
her power level. We observe that the proposed scheme can
efficiently degrade the secure throughput of the legitimate
system. For example, when γA = 5 dB, without attacks, the
secure throughput of the legitimate system is 0.7 packets/slot
when λA = 0.7 packets/slot, which implies that all the input
data will be served. Under attacks, the secure throughput is 0.3
packets/slot. Hence, the secure throughput loss is 57%, which
demonstrates the efficiency and effectiveness of our proposed
scheme.
REFERENCES
[1] R. Zhang and C. K. Ho, “MIMO broadcasting for simultaneous wire-
less information and power transfer,” IEEE Trans. Wireless Commun.,
vol. 12, no. 5, pp. 1989–2001, May 2013.
[2] A. D. Wyner, “The wire-tap channel,” Bell Syst. Tech. J., vol. 54, no. 8,
pp. 1355–1387, 1975.
[3] S. Amin, A. A. Ca´rdenas, and S. S. Sastry, “Safe and secure networked
control systems under denial-of-service attacks,” in International Work-
shop on Hybrid Systems: Computation and Control. Springer, 2009,
pp. 31–45.
[4] M. Zhu and S. Martı´nez, “On the performance analysis of resilient
networked control systems under replay attacks,” IEEE Trans. Autom.
Control, vol. 59, no. 3, pp. 804–808, 2014.
[5] Y. Mo, R. Chabukswar, and B. Sinopoli, “Detecting integrity attacks on
SCADA systems,” IEEE Trans. Control Syst. Technol., vol. 22, no. 4,
pp. 1396–1407, 2014.
[6] H. Zhang, P. Cheng, L. Shi, and J. Chen, “Optimal DoS attack policy
against remote state estimation,” in IEEE CDC, 2013, pp. 5444–5449.
[7] R. Poisel, Modern Communications Jamming: Principles and Tech-
niques. Artech House, 2011.
[8] A. Gupta, C. Langbort, and T. Bas¸ar, “Optimal control in the presence
of an intelligent jammer with limited actions,” in IEEE CDC, 2010, pp.
1096–1101.
[9] M. Li, I. Koutsopoulos, and R. Poovendran, “Optimal jamming attack
strategies and network defense policies in wireless sensor networks,”
IEEE Trans. Mobile Comput., vol. 9, no. 8, pp. 1119–1133, 2010.
[10] M. Zuba, Z. Shi, Z. Peng, and J.-H. Cui, “Launching denial-of-service
jamming attacks in underwater sensor networks,” in IWUR. ACM,
2011, p. 12.
[11] H. Zhang, P. Cheng, L. Shi, and J. Chen, “Optimal DoS attack scheduling
in wireless networked control system,” IEEE Trans. Control Syst.
Technol., vol. 24, no. 3, pp. 843–852, 2016.
[12] M. Zhang, Y. Liu, and R. Zhang, “Artificial noise aided secrecy infor-
mation and power transfer in OFDMA systems,” IEEE Trans. Wireless
Commun., vol. 15, no. 4, pp. 3085–3096, Apr. 2016.
[13] A. K. Sadek, K. R. Liu, and A. Ephremides, “Cognitive multiple access
via cooperation: Protocol design and performance analysis,” IEEE Trans.
Inf. Theory, vol. 53, no. 10, pp. 3677–3696, 2007.
